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Abstract
Experimental evidence from modi￿ed dictator games and simple choice situations
indicates that concern for overall welfare is an important motive in human decision
making. Models of inequality averse agents, as suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), fall short in explaining behavior of proposers, who
reduce their payo⁄ below a fair split of the endowment to maximize social welfare,
while other types of social preferences do well on these data. This has created the
impression that inequality aversion is a misguided concept. This paper presents a
formal model and shows that a combination of welfare concern and inequality aversion
changes this result in favor of inequality aversion. It also establishes a unique link
between altruism and social welfare in the proposed model.
JEL classi￿cation: A13, B49, C70, D63, D64
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11 Introduction
Departures from purely self-interested behavior in economic experiments have inspired mod-
els of social preferences, where researchers experiment with di⁄erent ways of analytically
decoding individuals￿concern for others. The main focus of this work is on decomposing
experimentally observed concern for the outcomes of others into underlying primary be-
havioral motives. Social preferences formally depict other-regarding motivations of human
decision making in addition to pure self-interest. Thereby they contrast with the canonical
neoclassical economic models that are based on the hypothesis that all people are exclusively
concerned about their own material well-being.1
At present, models of altruism, inequality aversion and reciprocity provide exclusive
explanations of non-sel￿sh behavior in some economic environments, but compete for ex-
planatory power in others. While, for example, altruism, inequality aversion or reciprocity
are a rational for sharing of a surplus as observed in Ultimatum Game experiments, only
inequality aversion or reciprocity are consistent with the rejection of low o⁄ers. On the
other hand, only inequality aversion and altruism provide explanations for unilaterally mo-
tivated transfers in Dictator Games. The intuition therefore is that inequality averse agents
mind the initial unequal payo⁄ allocation and altruists enjoy their own as well as others
well-being. As the Dictator Game is a one-sided one-o⁄ decision without any interaction
the intention-based concept of reciprocity does not apply to it. In turn, reciprocity is the
only concept incorporating a progression of action. Inequality aversion and altruism, two
outcome-based concepts, disregard this potentially important information. Thus, while an
ad hoc success of all three of these social preference motives to explain experimental data
in exclusive domains has manifested the validity of each concept as an individual behavioral
motive, there is still much disagreement about the validity of each single motive whenever
a strategic situation allows more concepts to be successfully applied.
A turning point in the discussion about the respective validity of inequality aversion
and reciprocity seemed to be reached when Charness and Rabin (2002) confronted models
of distributional preferences and reciprocity with data from a large scale experiment on
simple decision problems between two payo⁄ allocations. They found that overall-welfare
was frequently maximized, but that this concern, including the other player￿ s wealth, sig-
ni￿cantly decreased when a previous action was perceived as unkind. Both reciprocity and
inequality aversion as exclusive social motives were inconsistent with a large fraction of the
1Self-interest throughout this paper strictly refers to this narrow interpretetion.
2experimental choices they observed. Charness and Rabin interpret this as evidence against
the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of pure inequality aversion and show conclusively that
most of the observed behavior can be explained by reciprocity in combination with direct
welfare concern. Combining reciprocity and welfare concern in one model, they report an
overall consistency with the observed choices of 94 (95) percent of their approach, while the
consistency of inequality aversion remains at 82 (86) percent. Still, both do signi￿cantly
better than the neoclassical pure self-interest hypothesis with 73 (84) percent.2 However,
this evaluation of these two competing behavioral motives is biased in favor of their own
model. With evidence at hand that welfare concern is a motive of its own, and their exper-
imental games in which the welfare motive matters, a comparison should be done between
two hybrid models.
The following paper suggests an inequality-averse social welfare maximizer (henceforth
IASW) model and shows that it is an adequate counterpart. It ￿ts well in a recent literature
that has experimented with hybrid models3 and demonstrates once the Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) benchmark model is extended by welfare concern it is applicable to broader sets
of experimental data, like the Charness and Rabin (2002) dataset, where a model of pure
inequality aversion was misguided. The reason therefore is that inequality aversion on its own
fails to express the tension individuals seem to feel, when social welfare can be maximized
but di⁄erence thereby also increases. The IASW model o⁄ers insights in the interplay
between these concerns, that can o⁄set or reinforce each other. I also show that combining
inequality aversion and welfare concern, Charness and Rabin (2002)￿ s consistency measure
changes in favor of the IASW model (98 percent). Finally, the step of formalizing a model
of how inequality aversion and welfare concern may interact induces conjectures that can
be confronted with (new) experimental data. If the model is accepted it o⁄ers additional
insights into the nature of preferences.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents experimental evidence for wel-
fare concern. Section 3 reviews some recent social preference models. It closes with a
formal depiction of altruism. Then section 4 suggests a new theoretical model (IASW) of
inequality-aversion and social welfare concern. The model is comprehensively introduced
on the Ultimatum Game and then confronted with further experimental data in section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2Di⁄erent values result from di⁄erent assumptions about ￿rst the players￿knowledge.
3Charness and Rabin (2002) combine reciprocity and welfare concern, Falk and Fischbacher (2005) reci-
procity and inequality aversion in a formal model.
32 Experimental Evidence of Welfare Concern
The simplest game to elicit welfare concern is a generalized version of the Dictator Game.
In the standard version of the Dictator Game (henceforth DG) two players are allotted
an initial sum of money, which for simplicity is normed to 1. The ￿rst player, called the
proposer (or dictator), can unilaterally decide how to split this endowment by choosing a
transfer t. The second player, called the receiver, then receives the share t 2 [0;1] of the
initial endowment that is allocated to him as determined by the dictator. In the generalized
version of the Dictator Game the setting is very similar. Again the initial endowment to
be divided by the dictator equals one. However, now the share which gets allocated to the
receiver is multiplied by the experimenter at a previously announced exchange rate 1 : m.
Thus, in the generalized DG, ￿nal welfare is directly at stake through a connection to the
allocative decision of the dictator.
￿gure 1 about here
Inequality aversion and altruism are the only motives that can explain an incentive to
share at all in the DG. Concern for total welfare contains an altruistic component. It can be
separated from inequality aversion by comparing transfers t in a generalized version of the
DG at a varying exchange rate. If mean transfers increase disproportionate to welfare in m
then the prospect of a higher overall welfare itself at higher m has triggered the increased
transfer. This evidence for inequality aversion as at most a partial motive is particularly
strong if also o⁄ers are made such that the inequality between players (again) increases; e.g.
if shares that transfer more than half of the ￿nal total welfare are o⁄ered.
Empirically a¢ rmative evidence for welfare concern as an independent behavioral motive
was identi￿ed in generalized DG experiments with exchange rates varying from 1:1 to 1:4
by Andreoni and Miller (2002), Bolle and Kritikos (2001), Cox (2000) and G￿th, Kliemt
and Ockenfels (2002). The latter group of authors excepted, all these papers indicate a non-
negligible fraction of players who were willing to give up a proportion of their own monetary
payo⁄ if they could increase total welfare. This proportion was the higher the more players
could increase total welfare, i.e. @t=@m > 0. Such behavior was observed even when doing
so implied that proposers generate inequality to their own disadvantage. In the standard DG
where the exchange rate is 1:1, there are virtually no subjects who transferred more than 50
4percent of the total welfare.4 In contrast, when the exchange rate increases to 1:3, i.e. the
experimenter triples the proposed transfer, Cox (2000), for instance, ￿nds that a fraction of
60 percent make welfare-maximizing transfers such that they end up with less money than
the receiver. Because disadvantageous inequality must be compensated for inequality averse
players, this is strong evidence for independent welfare concern.
Other empirical evidence of welfare concern, also establishing a discrimination between
the competing approaches of distributional and reciprocal preferences, is found in Charness
and Rabin (2002, henceforth CR). CR confront models of distributional preferences and
reciprocity with data from a large scale experiment on simple decision problems between
two payo⁄ allocations. In one and two-stage games they ￿nd that reciprocity and inequality
aversion on their own as motives of social preferences were inconsistent with a large fraction
of the experimental choices. In their experiment, in which the one-stage decision problems
can be interpreted as generalized DGs with only two payo⁄ situations, welfare at stake
was frequently maximized even when the allocator had to trade o⁄ a proportion of his
own payo⁄ and doing so increased inequality; i.e. when welfare maximization was costly.
When experimentees had to choose between (400,400) and (375,750), on average 66 percent
chose the latter, welfare maximizing allocation. These choices are inconsistent with pure
inequality aversion models since the di⁄erence between players increased, while the own
payo⁄ decreased. Neither they are consistent with any model of pure reciprocity, since a
one sided one-o⁄ choice leaves no scope for reciprocal concerns. Again these choices reveal
a direct and independent concern for welfare.
3 Review of recent Social Preference Models
Within the formal rational-choice models that explain the various experimental evidence
two main approaches can be distinguished. The ￿rst focuses on distributional preferences,
which means there are at least some people who care not only about absolute, but also
about relative well-being. Distributional preferences assume that agents prefer to minimize
di⁄erences between their own monetary payo⁄ and those of other people. The second ap-
proach in contrast assumes reciprocal preferences, i.e. that agents care about the intentions
behind an action, and that they want to reward kind and punish unkind behavior. This
4This is a reason why inequality aversion has more appeal than pure altruim as a behavioral motive.
5section reviews recent models of social preferences and closes by introducing a formal model
of altruism.5
3.1 Distributional Preferences
Models of distributional preferences have been proposed by Loewenstein, Bazerman, and
Thompson (1989), Bolton (1991), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Fehr and Schmidt (1999,
henceforth FS). The last two approaches thereby o⁄er the most readily applicable models.
While FS model the intuition that individuals compare themselves to single members of
a reference group, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) believe that inequality averse agents com-
pare themselves to a group average. Engelmann and Strobel (2004) test these competing
hypotheses and ￿nd that experimental evidence is often in favor of the FS intuition.6 In
FS￿model, which is the basis for the following inequality aversion and social welfare model,
player i 2 [1;:::;n] has preferences of the following form:










maxfxi ￿ xj;0g. (1)
There are n players and FS assume ￿i ￿ ￿i, 0 ￿ ￿i < 1, where ￿i and ￿i are the parameters
of the model measuring how much player i dislikes having less money or more money than
others. This means that receiving a smaller payo⁄ than others a⁄ects a person at least as
much as getting more, and that he is never so a⁄ected by getting more than others as to want
to throw away his own money without bene￿ting others. With that model FS can match
experimental data in the Ultimatum Game, Public Good Games, Market Games (henceforth
UG, PGGs, MGs) and some other games, and they can explain why there is an incentive
for sharing in the DG.
3.2 Reciprocity Preferences
Reciprocity preferences motivated by the observation that players care about the intentions
of other players, and that they are willing to sacri￿ce money to reward kind and to punish
5Early (partly formal) ideas of social preferences date back to Veblen (1934), Duesenberry (1949), Leiben-
stein (1950), Pollak (1976) and somewhat later the in￿uential Rabin (1993).
6Furthermore CR ￿nd that more than 50 percent of the participants assigned as player C in a three-
person dictator game, in which C decides between (575, 575, 575) and (900, 300, 600), sacri￿ce 25 tokens to
equalize payo⁄s among players. This result favors the FS intuition of inequality aversion also in their choice
situations.
6unkind behavior. Therefore a natural prerequisite for games in the domain of reciprocity is
that they are not merely one-sided decision tasks, as in the DG, but are of an interactive
character.
Formal models of reciprocity have been developed by Rabin (1993), Falk and Fischbacher
(2005), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and CR. The latter two groups of authors
combine reciprocity with inequality aversion and welfare concern respectively. Falk and
Fischbacher (2005) show that there are parameter constellations for which their model is
consistent with the stylized facts from the DG,7 UG, PGG, MG, and some other games, but
this result has to be contrasted with the complexity of their model. Without presenting any
of formal model of reciprocity preferences in detail, the concept can be represented in an
over-simpli￿ed form as:
ui(xi;xj) = xi + fi(xi;xj) ￿ fj(xi;xj) , (2)
where fi and fj are so called kindness functions. fi is a measure of how kindly player i
treats player j, and fj is a measure of player i￿ s belief about whether player j is treating
him kindly. A positive value for each of these kindness functions indicates kind behavior,
and a negative value indicates mean behavior.
Any such utility speci￿cation assumes a tendency to reciprocate, since utility at a given
payo⁄is maximized by rewarding an opponent who is believed to be kind with kind behavior.
Likewise, if player i believes that player j was acting sel￿shly or mean he will wish to
echo this behavior and react unkindly. In determining the reciprocal reaction it is crucial
how a player interprets the behavior of other players, but the therefore necessary beliefs
about other players￿behavior are not captured by traditional game theory. For that reason
reciprocity preferences require the framework of psychological game theory, as developed by
Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Staccetti (1989). In this framework the equilibrium concept is, as
in traditional game theory, a play of mutual best response, but requires in addition that the
players￿beliefs about the other players￿actions match the equilibrium behavior. Due to this
dependency, models of reciprocity have the drawback that their (psychological) equilibrium
concept makes them often very di¢ cult to apply, even in relatively simple experimental
games. Sometimes there occur many equilibria due to di⁄erent self-ful￿lling beliefs about
intentions, so that the theory then remains ambiguous in its prediction.8
7The ability of the Falk and Fischbacher (2005) model of reciprocity preferences to explain the DG is
purely due to the inequality aversion part of their preferences.
8The survey "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic applications" by Fehr and
73.3 Altruistic Preferences and Welfare Concern
The Encyclopaedia Britannica (1998) de￿nes an altruistic person as someone who feels the
obligation "to further the pleasures and alleviate the pains of other people." "The hypothesis
that people are altruistic has a long tradition in economics and has been used to explain char-
itable donations and the voluntary provision of public goods (see, e.g., G. Becker, 1974)."
(Fehr and Schmidt 2003, p. 220) For an economic agent to be altruistic means that such
a person￿ s well-being is positively related to (increases with) other persons￿well-being. Ex-
pressed formally, a person i is said to be altruistic if his utility function ui(x1;:::;xn) has
the following properties:
@ui(x1;:::;xn)
@xj > 0 if j 2 [1;:::;i ￿ 1;i + 1;:::;n] ; (3)
i.e. the ￿rst partial derivatives of his utility function ui(x1;:::;xn) with respect to any
co-players￿payo⁄ xj, where j 6= i, are strictly positive. This easy representation makes it
also straight forward to include an explicit altruistic inclination in any preference pro￿le.
To explicitly consider altruistic concerns one needs only to add the (weighted) payo⁄s of
the other players to the utility function. Thus, a most simple model of a constant degree of
altruism is given by:




If an altruist puts the same weight ￿ on the well-being of all others, then xi +
P
j6=i ￿xj ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)xi + ￿
Pn
j=1 xj. This is equivalent to saying such a person is welfare concerned.
Throughout the paper any agent i who cares to the same extent about others than for




@xi , is called a perfect altruist. In
model (4) perfect altruism implies ￿i = 1, for all i 2 f1;:::;ng, and consequently, for perfect
altruists only social welfare matters.
4 A Model of Inequality Aversion and Social Welfare
(IASW)
As indicated by the generalized DG experiments welfare concern matters. Recognizing this it
is an important step to combine welfare concern with inequality aversion. The combination
Schmidt (2003), and Gintis (2000)￿textbook are comprehensive summaries, also of less well-known proposals
in this ￿eld.
8allows inequality aversion to be applied to a broader domain of games. Further, formalization
of the hypothesis that these two motives interact yields rigorously testable model predictions,
which can be confronted with experimental data and compared to competing approaches.9
Doing so, I show in section 5.1 that the consistency ￿ndings of CR change in favor of an
inequality-averse welfare maximizer.
While CR, who ￿rst accounted for welfare concern, combine reciprocity with a convex
combination of the egalitarian and utilitarian welfare function:




part of this (broader) welfare-motive is readily represented in inequality aversion. Inequality
aversion, when strong enough, exactly expresses the desire to equalize payo⁄s, i.e. it covers
the egalitarian motive. Having recognized this, it is straightforward to include utilitarian
welfare concern in an inequality aversion model. The utility function of player i 2 [1;:::;n]
is then given by:














maxfxi ￿ xj;0g ;
where ￿i ￿ ￿i, 0 ￿ ￿i < 1, and 0 ￿ ￿i ￿ 1. Parameter ￿i expresses the degree of player i￿ s
welfare concern. The inequality averse welfare maximizer model retains the properties and
interpretation of the FS inequality aversion model, but in addition player i directly cares
for social welfare
Pn
j=1 xj, whenever ￿i 6= 0. An increase in welfare, regardless of how it is
distributed, now can have an o⁄setting e⁄ect on an increase in di⁄erence.
Rewriting (6) as follows gives the welfare maximization motive the altruistic interpreta-
tion:













maxfxi ￿ xj;0g : (7)
Player i can thus be seen as a welfare concerned person (6), or equivalently an altruist
(7). In both versions the model embodies a tension between inequality aversion and welfare
concern, whenever these two goals have to be traded-o⁄. The tension of the trade-o⁄ is
9Of course, arbitrary de￿nition of preferences inevitably would lead to a theory that lacks any insight and
is purely descriptive, but if new models are guided by experimental evidence and revised by experimental
testing this caveat can be avoided.
9determined by the weights (￿i;￿i;￿i) of the di⁄erent concerns, i.e. player-type dependent,
and in￿ uenced by the speci￿c exchange rate or multiplier vector m = ￿@x￿i=@xi, where
x￿i = [x1;:::;xi￿1;xi+1;:::;xn]￿ , at which welfare can be created.
To illustrate this, take a look at the utility function of a player who decides to give up
one Euro in a two-player case. For the two-player case (7) simpli￿es to:
ui(x) = xi + ￿ixj ￿ ￿i maxfxj ￿ xi;0g ￿ ￿i maxfxi ￿ xj;0g ; (8)





> > > <
> > > :
1 + ￿i + [￿i ￿ ￿i]m if xi < xj
1 ￿ ￿i ￿ [￿i + ￿i]m if xi > xj
1 ￿ ￿im if xi = xj :
(9)
Playing a standard DG with exchange ratio 1:1, i.e. m = 1, all player-types with 1 ￿
2￿i ￿￿i > 0 are utility-maximizing by sharing the pie equally. Since there are never players
with 1+2￿i ￿￿i > 0, even for welfare concerned players it is not optimal to volunteer more
than half. Finally, only a perfect altruist, i.e. ￿i = 1, could be indi⁄erent about giving a
high amount.
It is worthwhile noting that, because of the linearity of the model, all crucial type char-
acterizations (according to the algebraic sign of the respective marginal utilities) will yield
linear parameter restrictions characterizing the player population. Continuing the example
emphasizes this point. If we observe that 50 percent of the players o⁄er zero and 50 percent
o⁄er 0.5 of the welfare, all we know is that -if our model is correct- there must be a player-
type distribution function F(￿;￿;￿) such that 50 percent of the players lie below and 50
percent above the line 1 ￿ 2￿i ￿ ￿i = 0 in the (￿;￿)-plane of the parameter space. This
implies that in the DG altruism ￿ and advantageous inequality aversion ￿ are interchange-
able within certain limits without a⁄ecting the observed outcome. Or, stating this result
di⁄erently, a standard DG is suitable to characterize, but not to identify, the player-type
distribution. Next, an extensive analysis of the IASW-model on the UG is presented.
104.1 Illustration of IASW on the Ultimatum Game
4.1.1 The Ultimatum Game
In the UG two players are allotted a sum of money (for simplicity normed to 1). The ￿rst
player, often called the proposer, o⁄ers some share s 2 [0;1] of the money to the second
player, called the responder. If the responder accepts, he receives what was o⁄ered, and the
proposer retains the rest. If the responder rejects the o⁄er, both players get nothing. Thus,
for purely self-interest responders, accepting any o⁄er is at least as good as rejecting and
they will never reject. Self-interested proposers anticipate this behavior and then maximize
their utility by o⁄ering nothing. Do not share and always accept is then the unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium prediction for the UG.10 The Ultimatum Game could not be simpler.
It is thus an excellent starting point to test a new theory. Like the classical inequality
aversion model, the IASW model assumes that o⁄ers s > 0 are triggered by inequality averse
responders who would reject small o⁄ers. Independently of such triggered positive o⁄ers,
non-zero o⁄ers will also be made by proposers who are themselves substantially inequality
averse. The fact that the IASW responders may have an altruistic inclination mitigates their
degree of inequality aversion, but does not change its essential implication that low o⁄ers
could be turned down. For proposers with IASW preferences an initial inclination to share
due to being inequality averse is reinforced by their degree of altruism.
￿gure 2 about here
4.1.2 The optimal Responder Behavior
Intuitively, where self-interest, altruism, and inequality aversion just o⁄set each other, play-
ers are willing to share and accept a broad range of o⁄ers. The formal analyses of the UG
starts with determining what share will by accepted by responders, assuming that they have
IASW preferences. Proposition 1 summarizes the results.
10The responder￿ s acceptance of a zero o⁄er holds with weak preference. He is assumed to always accept.
If the responder is assumed to always reject a zero o⁄er the unique equilibrium becomes (1 ￿ x;x), where x
is the smallest available money unit. Throughout, I use the ￿rst assumption.
11Proposition 1 It is a dominant strategy for the responder R to accept any o⁄er
s ￿
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
sH 2 (0:5;1] always (i)
sM 2 f0:5g always (ii)
sL 2 [0;0:5) if player-type is 1 + 2￿R ￿ ￿R > 0







sL 2 [0;0:5) if player-type is 1 + 2￿R ￿ ￿R = 0 (iv)
and to reject s otherwise. 11; 12
Proof. (i), (ii): A responder R will accept any o⁄er ~ s 2 fsM;sHg if his utility from accepting
such an o⁄er is strictly greater than his utility from a rejection, where social welfare is zero.
Since uR(~ s) = (1 ￿ ￿R)~ s + (￿R + ￿R)(1 ￿ ~ s) > uR(0) = 0 for all responder-types an o⁄er
~ s ￿ 0:5 will never be rejected. (iii), (iv): Similarly, acceptance of a low o⁄er sL 2 [0;0:5)
requires that sL induces at least as much utility as a rejection. In terms of utility this means
uR(sL) = (1 + ￿R)sL ￿ (￿R ￿ ￿R)(1 ￿ sL) ￿ uR(0) = 0. This inequality always holds when
1+2￿R ￿￿R = 0, e.g. for all responders who are perfect altruists, without disadvantageous
inequality aversion. Since the left hand side of the inequality is strictly increasing in small
o⁄ers, for all other responder-types 1 + 2￿R ￿ ￿R > 0 the inequality holds if low o⁄ers sL
are greater than a critical value sRc
L (￿;￿). This critical value sRc
L is de￿ned as the lowest
o⁄er that just ful￿lls the inequality, and is given by sRc
L (￿;￿) =
￿R￿￿R
1+2￿R￿￿R if ￿R ￿ ￿R ￿ 0
and by sRc
L = 0 if ￿R ￿ ￿R < 0. Figure 4 shows the critical value sRc
L (￿;￿) for di⁄erent
responder-types (￿R;￿R) 2 f[0;4] ￿ [0;1]g:
￿gure 3 about here
The acceptance threshold sRc
L (￿;￿) is strictly increasing in ￿R, strictly decreasing in ￿R,
and has an upper limit of lim￿!1 sRc
L (￿;￿) = 0:5 for all ￿R 2 [0;1]. Di⁄erent responders
11Because of ￿R > 0 and ￿R 2 [0;1], responder-types with 1 + 2￿R ￿ ￿R < 0 do not exist.
12For notational simplicity subscripts of (￿;￿ ;￿) within the critical values for the responder sRc
L and
the proposer sPc
L are dropped. The critical values can be uniquely identi￿ed by the superscripts R and P.
In addition, critical values with (￿;￿) dependence always represent the responder, while those with (￿;￿)
dependence refer exclusively to the proposer. This is due to the fact that, where the critcal values are
relevant, i.e. for small o⁄ers sL < 0:5; the analysis of proposer and responder behavior in the UG remains
in speci￿c inequality regions, namely the advantegeous and the inadvantegous respectively.
12on one level curve share a common threshold ^ sRc









. All responders who are more altruistic and/or less inequality averse
than the responders on the level curve given by ^ sRc
L have lower acceptance thresholds and
will also accept any o⁄er s = ^ sRc
L .
4.1.3 The optimal Proposer Behavior
The optimal Proposer Behavior under Certainty about the Responder-Type
Proposition 2 If a proposer P of type (￿P;￿P;￿P) knew the responders preference-type
(￿R;￿R;￿R); then she will o⁄er
s￿ 2
8
> > > > > > <










if 1 ￿ 2￿P + ￿P = 0 (ii)





if 1 ￿ 2￿P + ￿P > 0 (iv)
in equilibrium, and her o⁄er s￿will always be accepted.
Proof. Acceptance of s￿ follows directly from proposition 1. Claim (i); that proposers who






share that is accepted, follows directly from their utility function, which allows them to
always enjoy the social welfare uP(s￿) = (1 ￿ s￿) + s￿ = 1. For all other types, however, it
is never optimal to o⁄er a share sH > 0:5. Or, put di⁄erently, there exists at least one o⁄er
~ s ￿ 0:5 for which uP(~ s) ￿ uP(sH). Rewriting uP(~ s) ￿ uP(sH) and choosing ~ s = 0:5 yields
uP(sH)￿uP(0:5) = (1+￿P)(1￿sH)￿(￿P ￿￿P)sH ￿0:5(1+￿P), which can be simpli￿ed
to 0:5(1+2￿P ￿￿P)(1￿sH), an expression that is < 0 for all proposer-types (￿P;￿P;￿P);
such that [￿P 6= 0, ￿P 6= 0, ￿P 6= 1]; whenever sH < 1. For sH = 1; uP(sH) ￿ uP(0:5) < 0
follows directly. Thus o⁄ering the share ~ s = sM = 0:5 is a dominant strategy for almost
all proposers, and such proposers only need to compare their utility from o⁄ering a small
share to their utility from o⁄ering a medium share when making a decision. Looking at
this utility di⁄erence uP(sL) ￿ uP(0:5) = (1 ￿ ￿P)(1 ￿ sL) + (￿P + ￿P)sL ￿ 0:5(1 + ￿P) =
0:5(1￿2￿P +￿P)(1￿sL), regrouping yields the conditions 1￿2￿P +￿P S 0 on (￿P;￿P) for
(ii), (iii) and (iv). Finally, noting that proposers who are not indi⁄erent, but uniquely prefer
a small o⁄er will choose the small o⁄er that maximizes their the utility, i.e. sRc
L , which is
the lowest small o⁄er that will still be accepted, completes the proof of proposition 2.
13Under laboratory conditions the Ultimatum Game is played under complete anonymity.
At the time making her o⁄er the proposer does not know which type of responder she will
face. She might, however, have a belief about the distribution of types which stems from
past or outside experience she will apply when making her decision. How this uncertainty
about the responder-type a⁄ects the optimal proposer behavior is discussed below.
The optimal Proposer Behavior under Uncertainty about the Responder-Type
Proposition 3 If the proposer does not know the preferences of the responder, but believes
that the responder-types (￿R;￿R;￿R) are distributed according to a joint distribution function




> > > <
> > > :
pL = p(sL) (i)
pM = p(sM) = 1 (ii)




> > > <
> > > :
0 if sL < sRc
L (￿;￿) = sRc
L
F(￿;￿;￿ j sL ￿ sRc
L ) 2 (0;1) if sRc
L ￿ sL < sRc
L
1 if sL ￿ sRc
L (￿;￿) = sRc
L
The critical values sRc
L and sRc
L are the lowest and highest responder acceptance-thresholds
for low o⁄ers sL in the responder population.
Proof. (i): Let F(￿;￿;￿) be the joint distribution function of responder-types (￿R;￿R;￿R),








; where 0 ￿ ￿ < ￿ < 1, 0 ￿ ￿ < ￿ < minf1;￿g and
0 ￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ 1: pL=0 and pL=1 follow directly from proposition 1, part (iii) and (iv).
pL = F(￿;￿;￿ j sL ￿ sRc
L ) is true by de￿nition of F(￿;￿;￿) and sRc
L (￿;￿). (ii) and (iii):
pM=pH=1 follow directly from proposition 1, part (ii) and (i), respectively.
When considering her best o⁄er in the game the utility maximizing proposer compares her
expected utility E [uP(s)] = p(s)￿uP(s) from di⁄erent o⁄ers s, where the acceptance proba-
bility p = p(s) is itself endogenous. Since pM=pH=1 the result (i) of proposition 2 still holds:
Only perfectly altruistic and non inequality-averse players are weakly willing to propose a
high o⁄er. Therefore for all other proposer-types f(￿P;￿P;￿P)j(￿P;￿P;￿P) = 2 (0;0;1)g,
who already strictly prefer a medium to a large o⁄er, it is su¢ cient to compare the expected
14utility maximum from the best low-o⁄er with their utility from a medium o⁄er. Given the
responder-type distribution F(￿;￿;￿), thus p(s), let s￿
L 2 [0;0:5) be the best low-o⁄er a
proposer can make; i.e. s￿
L 2 argmaxsL fE [uP(sL)] = p(sL) ￿ uP(sL)g. To ￿nd a formal
choice-condition for the proposer, I compare the expected utility E [uP(s￿
L)] from making
the best low-o⁄er to the utility this proposer-type will gain from a medium o⁄er uP(sM).
This comparison leads to an o⁄er-choice-condition. The o⁄er-choice-condition is a set of
critical proposer values sPc
L (￿;￿jp￿
L); that depend on the proposer-type (￿P;￿P) as well as






L) ￿ uP(sM) ,
, p￿
L ￿ f(1 ￿ s￿
L) + ￿Ps￿
L ￿ ￿P [(1 ￿ s￿
L) ￿ s￿
L]g
￿ (1 ￿ sM) ￿ ￿PsM = 0:5(1 + ￿P)
, p￿
L ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿P) ￿ s￿
L (1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P)] ￿ 0:5(1 + ￿P)
,
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L (￿;￿) if 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P > 0 (A)
s￿
L ￿ sPc
L (￿;￿) if 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P < 0 (B)
always,14 if 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P = 0
where E [uP(s￿
L)] < uP(sM) for all p￿
L 2 [0;1) (C1)
where E [uP(s￿
L)] = uP(sM) for p￿
L = 1 . (C2)
(10)
All proposers choose their preferred o⁄er from fs￿
L;sMg according to the respective part
of this o⁄er-choice-condition. For all non-perfectly altruistic or inequality averse proposer-
types, this preferred o⁄er will also be their optimal o⁄er s￿. To illustrate the o⁄er-choice-
condition ￿gure 4 presents a simulation of the critical proposer-value sPc
L (￿;￿jp￿
L = 0:7) and
the proposer-types￿choices over the admitted parameter range f(￿;￿) 2 [0;1) ￿ [0;1]g for an
-arbitrarily assumed- optimal acceptance-probability p￿
L=0.7. Where the critical proposer
value sPc
L = 2 [0;1] takes the value of an unde￿ned o⁄er, its value is plotted as the nearest limit
of the integral [0;1], i.e. the closest de￿ned o⁄er. All critical thresholds in the proposer-type
characterization are lines in the (￿;￿)-plane, where sPc
L = 0. The plane sPc
L = 0:5 in ￿gure
13p￿
L is predetermined as proposers at this stage already have chosen their best low-o⁄er s￿
L from all
available low o⁄ers.




L > 0:5, and converges with increasing p￿
L to the second line 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P = 0
[2], which occurs at the discontinuity of the proposers￿critical value sPc
L (￿;￿). Note that
1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P > 0 to the left of line [2] and < 0 to its right. Thus, by (10A), if the best
low-o⁄er s￿
L in the region 1￿2￿P ￿￿P > 0 to left of [2] is weakly bigger than sPc
L , proposers






; they choose the medium o⁄er sM. In the
region to the right of [2] part (10B) of the o⁄er-choice-condition is valid and the opposite is
true.
The non-existence of the ￿rst threshold-line [1] for p￿
L ￿ 0:5 is intuitive. If the acceptance
probability of low o⁄ers is small, i.e. pL ￿ 0:5 for any sL, then already the expected utility of
the lowest low-o⁄er, sL = 0, is never higher than the utility from o⁄ering half of the welfare,
which will be accepted with certainty. On the contrary, for higher acceptance probabilities
of low o⁄ers pL > 0:5, as they are observed in experiments, it becomes worthwhile for some
proposer-types to o⁄er small shares instead of an equal division.
￿gure 4 about here
With the o⁄er-choice-condition I can fully characterize the proposer-type distribution.
If p￿
L > 0:5, by (10B), proposers who possess relatively low (￿;￿)-values, i.e. the more self-






proposers will choose the lowest sL = s￿
L that su¢ ces to yield the predetermined acceptance
probability p￿
L. If such a low o⁄er is not available, i.e. s￿
L ￿ sPc
L they will choose sM.
As inequality aversion and/or altruistic concern grow there is a turning point, that is 1 ￿
2p￿
L(1￿￿P)+￿P > 0 (all proposers to the right of [1]), after which all proposer-types strictly
prefer to make a medium o⁄er. Their degree of altruism combined with their relatively high
inequality aversion is now so strong that they do not want to propose any risky, unequal o⁄er,
even though they could ensure themselves a higher payo⁄. However, there are also proposers
(to the right of [2]) that are so highly inequality-averse and altruistic that regardless of the
responder-type distribution, and hence the o⁄er acceptance-probability, they always want to
o⁄er sM. Finally, there are potentially non-altruistic and inequality-averse proposers that
are indi⁄erent between a range of low o⁄ers that will be accepted for sure and a medium o⁄er,





. (10C2) They exist only, when their favored set of low o⁄ers
16￿ S￿
L contains exclusively low o⁄ers ￿ s￿
L 2 ￿ S￿
L, which induce a low-o⁄er acceptance probability
p(￿ s￿
L) = 1; i.e. the lowest o⁄er in this set must already be accepted with certainty. These
proposers-types can be found on the line [2], that for them coincides with [1]. For those
proposers the utility gained by giving away one Euro just o⁄sets the marginal disutility from
loosing this Euro because of their altruistic capability of enjoying others￿well-being and the
reduced di⁄erence. Proposition 4 collects these ￿ndings about the optimal o⁄er s￿ under
uncertainty about the responder-type when only the type-distribution is known.
Proposition 4 The optimal o⁄er s￿ of a proposer depends on her own type (￿P;￿P;￿P)
and the responder-type distribution F (￿;￿;￿). The responder-type distribution F (￿;￿;￿)
determines the o⁄er acceptance-probability p(s). According to whether a proposer-type facing
F (￿;￿;￿) has already a best low-o⁄er s￿
L that is big enough to induce a low-o⁄er acceptance
probability of p(s￿
L) = 1, two cases for the optimal o⁄er s￿ can be distinguished:
(A) If s￿
L ￿ sRc
L , then p(s￿
L) = 1 and the optimal o⁄er is given by:
s￿ 2
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if 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P = 0 (ii)
fsMg if 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P < 0 (iii)
fs￿
Lg if 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P > 0 (iv)
(B) If s￿
L < sRc
L , then p(s￿
L) < 1 and the optimal o⁄er is given by: 15
s￿ 2
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
[sM;1] if ￿P = ￿P = 0, ￿P = 1 (v)
fsMg if 1 ￿ 2pL(1 ￿ ￿P) + ￿P ￿ 0 (vi)




Lg if 1 ￿ 2pL(1 ￿ ￿P) + ￿P < 0 and s￿
L ￿ sPc
L (viii)
Proof. (A): Since these proposer-types have a most preferred low o⁄er s￿
L, which is higher
than the highest low-o⁄er acceptance threshold in the responder population sRc
L , all respon-
ders would accept the low o⁄er s￿
L, if such a low o⁄er was made. Thus, the proposer￿ s
o⁄er-choice problem under uncertainty about the responder-type in case (A) eventually fol-
lows her o⁄er-choice problem under certainty about the responder-type, in which only o⁄ers
that will be surely accepted are made. Hence the proof of (i)-(iv) is analogue to the proof
of proposition 2(i)-(iv).
15Subcases (vii) and (viii) are only feasible for pL ￿ 0:5.
17(B): Keeping ￿gure 9a in mind illustrates the single steps of the proof of proposition 4B.
(v) If ~ s￿ 2 [sM;1], by proposition 3 (ii) and (iii), p(~ s￿) = 1, and thus the proof of this part






L (￿;￿) = lim
(￿;￿)!(1;1)
1 ￿ ￿P ￿ 0:5(1 + ￿P)(p￿
L)
￿1
(1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P)
=
=
1 ￿ 1 ￿ 0:5(1 + 1)(p￿
L)
￿1






Secondly, since 1 ￿ ￿P ￿
1+￿P
2p￿












L is a continuous function of ￿ and ￿ in the regions 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P 7 0. Hence,
in the region 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P < 0 the critical value for the proposer sPc
L is always (weakly)
bigger than 0:5 for all allowed (￿;￿)-combinations and any low-o⁄er acceptance probability.
Since sL < 0:5 by (10B) it thus follows that these proposers strictly prefer a medium o⁄er
to any small one. (vi-b) Subregion 2, where 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P = 0. By (10C1) sM is strictly
preferred. (vi-c) Subregion 3, where 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P > 0 and 1 ￿ 2p￿
L(1 ￿ ￿P) + ￿P ￿ 0.
If 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P > 0 and 1 ￿ 2p￿
L(1 ￿ ￿P) + ￿P ￿ 0 do not coincide, the critical proposer
value sPc
L in the interjacent region is negative. This can be formally proved, or seen from
simulations (as exempli￿ed for p￿
L=0:7) and the continuity properties of sPc
L . Thus any low
o⁄er is greater than the negative sPc
L and from (10A) it follows directly that the medium
o⁄er sM is preferred; with strict preference for all proposer-types 1￿2p￿
L(1￿￿P)+￿P > 0.
(vii) and (viii) In the region 1 ￿ 2pL(1 ￿ ￿P) + ￿P < 0 the critical proposer value sPc
L is
positive and further sPc
L ￿ 0:5. Thus by (10A) the best small o⁄er s￿
L, that just induces the
previously determined best low-o⁄er acceptance probability pL(s￿
L); is strictly preferred by
these proposers to sM, whenever s￿
L < sPc
L and vice versa. (Indi⁄erent types are assumed
to choose s￿
L.)
The IASW implications, which are collected in propositions 1 and 4, account for many
of the facts observed in the Ultimatum Game. They indicate that large o⁄ers above 0.5 are
always accepted, but are only potentially made by non-inequality averse perfect altruists.
Very low o⁄ers are likely to be rejected by inequality averse types, and thus a variety
of proposers considers low and medium o⁄ers. This behavior is encouraged as inequality
aversion or welfare concern for them increases. As the FS model, IASW preferences have
18the potential to ￿t the UG well. By calibrating the IASW model on stylized facts from the
UG, I next characterize the distribution of the heterogeneous player-types.
4.2 Calibration of the IASW Model
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) stylized the actual o⁄ers observed in several Ultimatum Games as
follows: "There are roughly 40 percent of the subjects who suggest an equal split. Another
30 percent o⁄er s 2 [0:4;0:5), while 30 percent o⁄er less than 0:4. There are hardly any o⁄ers
below 0:25." They further note that in all UG experiments there is a fraction of subjects who
reject o⁄ers even if they are very close to an equal split and thus "conservatively" assume
that 10 percent of the subjects have an acceptance threshold of sRc
L = 4
9. They consider
that another, typically much larger, fraction of the population (about 30 percent) insists on
getting at least one-third of the welfare, and that another 30 percent of subjects insist on
getting at least one-quarter. Finally, as they observe, the remaining 30 percent of subjects
are happy to accept any positive o⁄er.
If a proposer does not know the type of her opponent, but believes that the acceptance
probability of an o⁄er p(s) is given by this distribution of the acceptance thresholds sRc
L (￿;￿),
it is straightforward to compute her optimal o⁄er s￿ 2 argmaxs fE [uP(s)] = p(s) ￿ uP(s)g
as a function of her type. (see appendix AI, p. 33) The optimal o⁄er is then given by:
s￿ 2
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if 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P = 0 and (￿P;￿P;￿P) = 2 f(0;0;1)g





if 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P > 0 and 1 ￿ 17
4 ￿P ￿ 13





if 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P > 0 and 1 ￿ 17
4 ￿P ￿ 13
4 ￿P ￿ 0 .
All the above information, and the thereby implied characterization of the player-type
distributions that are suitable to reproduce the stylized equilibrium o⁄ers s￿, are summarized
in the following table:
19Table 1: Characterization of Parameter Distributions, Responders￿Critical
Values, and Equilibrium O⁄ers according to FS￿Stylized Facts
observed calculated
distribution of acceptance thresholds cumulative accept-
and corresponding responder-types16 tance probability
30% sRc
L = 0 , ￿ ￿ ￿ 30% pL(0) = 0:3
30% sRc
L = 1








9 , 1 ￿ 1
4￿ + 5
4￿ = 0 100% pL(4
9) = 1
observed assumed
equilibrium o⁄er suggested distribution
(optimal o⁄er) of proposer-types17
30% s￿ = 1
3 30% 1 ￿ 17
4 ￿P ￿ 13
4 ￿P ￿ 0
30% s￿ = 4
9 60% 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P > 0
40% s￿ = 0:5 40% 1 ￿ 2￿P ￿ ￿P < 0
0% s￿ = sH 0% f￿P = ￿P = 0;￿P = 1g
Figures 5a and 5b below show how IASW allows welfare concern to interact with in-
equality aversion. The in￿ uence of welfare concern ￿i, i 2 fR;Pg, is graphed for responders
R and proposers P against the respectively relevant weights of inequality aversion ￿R and
￿P. A separation of inequality regions according to proposers and responders is possible
since in the stylized facts no o⁄ers greater than half of the endowment occur.
￿gure 5a and 5b about here
The ￿gures also illustrate as to how the FS-distribution of thresholds changes when
altruism comes into play, i.e. ￿i > 0. If one would like to accommodate a share of 30 percent
16Restrictions follow directly from Proposition 1.
17For a formal derivation of these restrictions see appendix AI. (p. 33)
20of perfect altruists with ￿i = 1 in the population then the FS-distribution of thresholds
changes, for instance, to a IASW parameter distribution as presented in table 2. The UG
play prediction under both preferences, the FS-model and the richer IASW-model, remains
equivalent.
Table 2: Assumptions about the Distribution of Preferences
FS (p. 844) IASW example
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
0 30% 0 30% 0:5 0 30% 0 0 30%
0:5 30% 0:25 30% 1 0 30% 0:25 0 30%
1 30% 0:6 40% 1 1 30% 0:6 0 10%
4 10% 4 0 10% 0:6 1 30%
The depicted IASW parameter distribution is a sample from the continuum of distri-
butions that allow for a positive degree of altruism in the UG. Nonetheless, focussing on
perfect altruists is an intuitive starting point to get a grasp on the more diverse variety of
player-types under the IASW model.
Let￿ s have a closer look at the interaction between inequality aversion and altruism
that is implied by the IASW model. In ￿gure 5a the tension between the two motives in
the responder case implies that responders with a common acceptance threshold sit on a
common (upwards sloping) line, and if some of them are more altruistic than others this
has to be o⁄set by a higher aversion to being on the short end of the payo⁄ distribution.
Without this o⁄setting e⁄ect responders would be willing to accept lower o⁄ers like their
less altruistic colleagues as their altruistic inclination increases.18 Conversely, for proposers
(￿gure 5b) inequality aversion and welfare concern reinforce each other as motives to share
their endowment. Since, ceteris paribus, more concern for others implies a higher willingness
to share, proposers who make equal o⁄ers can (and need) to be less inequality averse. Thus,
the critical type restrictions are all downwards sloping. Because only a discrete distribution
of acceptance thresholds exists, proposers o⁄ering the same share are in regions that collect
all proposer-types with an equal or higher willingness to share until the next acceptance
threshold is available. Disregarding the relevance of welfare concern, i.e. ￿ = 0 for all
18Since there is no negative o⁄er available, it is intuitive why the restriction for 30 percent accepting zero
o⁄ers does not need to be binding; i.e. these responder-types can also be to the left of the line ￿R = ￿R.
21players, the IASW model coincides immediately with the traditional FS model and the
(￿;￿)-parameter distribution found by FS is represented on the abscissae.
The coherence of the models makes the UG a very good starting point to introduce
the IASW model, because the UG was extensively analyzed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
However, in the UG welfare is only a binomial matter of existence and thus the game does
not lend itself to much quantitative exploration of welfare concern. Any (￿;￿;￿)-distribution
ful￿lling the above restrictions on proposer and responder-types is suitable to reproduce the
observed stylized facts of the UG in the IASW model, and there is no need to involve welfare
concern; i.e. (￿;￿;￿)-distributions with ￿i = 0 8 i 2 [1;:::;n] are feasible. This will change
in the next section, where the IASW model is confronted with welfare relevant experimental
data. Nonetheless, making the assumption that all proposers and responders in the UG are
randomly drawn from one representative population, it is already possible to infer one upper-
bound ￿-restriction from the given data.19 Namely, at least 30 percent of the proposers are
not more than moderately welfare concerned, i.e. ￿ ￿ 4
13 (see ￿gure 5b). Remarkably, this
result is roughly consistent with experiments from Andreoni and Miller (2002), who found
that welfare concern matters and suggested that 47.2% (22.7%) of the participants behave
as if they were purely self-interested, 30.4% (14.2%) according to Leontief and 22.4% (6.2%)
according to Utilitarian preferences [weak types (strong types)].20
5 The IASW Model on Welfare Relevant Data
5.1 Preference Evaluation by Charness and Rabin (2002)
A primary intention of CR is to collect evidence indicating that the "apparent adequacy of
inequality aversion models has likely been an artefact of powerful and decisive confounds in
the games used to construct these models." (CR, p. 849) In order to avoid framing in￿ uence
of the game structure, CR construct an abstract experiment, in which subjects were asked
to make choices over di⁄erent payo⁄ bundles. (see ￿gure 6) These choice situations were









B ), or as a sequential choice, in which ￿rst a player A chooses between
19Further assuming that the population of players is su¢ ciently large, such that the acceptance probability
does not change by randomly drawing one player from the population for the proposer role.
20These preference-types translate to game speci￿c (￿;￿;￿)-restrictions of the IASW model, such that
IASW actors behave in a game as if they had one of these classical types of preferences.
22(xend
A; ;xend
B ); in which case the game ends, or letting B enter, in which case B could choose









￿gure 6 about here
The experiment was conducted in thirteen sessions with a total of 32 games and 1680
observations. Eight sessions (games 1 to 12) were run at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra
in Barcelona and 5 sessions (games 13 to 32) at the University of California at Berkeley.
No participant could attend more than one session. According to CR (p. 825) "average
earnings were around $9 in Barcelona and $16 in Berkeley [or] about $6 and $11, net of the
show-up fee paid." In the sessions for games 17-32, players were anonymously rematched with
di⁄erent partners for up to six games, where games also included hypothetical choices. In the
other sessions, comprising games 1-16, candidates were only invited to play once. Following
CR￿ s consistency analysis of preferences, I disregard ￿ve three-player games comprising 106
observations. The payo⁄ allocations o⁄ered and actual choices made in the 27 two-player
games which I consider are reported in the appendix AII (p. 34).
Based on missing evidence for positive, but signi￿cant evidence for negative, reciprocity in




















triggered punishment,22 CR propose a model of egalitarian-utilitarian welfare concern and
a negative reciprocity motive. As indicated by a consistency check, these so-called social-
welfare preferences have the potential to ￿t the data much better than FS￿model of in-
equality aversion and a self-interest model. Consistency thereby requires that the observed
experimental behavior is explainable with a preference type for any parameter-value vector
permitted by the parameter-space restrictions of each type of (social) preference. Table 3
below shows the consistency numbers reported by CR. Clearly, social-welfare preferences
with an overall consistency of 95 percent outperform inequality aversion that achieves a
consistency of 86 percent, and the neoclassical model of pure self-interest with a consistency
21CR (p. 830 et sqq.) also remark that "it is of course somewhat arbitrary to compare models on this set
of games" and point out that it is di¢ cult to "de￿ne a ￿ fair￿test of the di⁄erent [...] preferences because we
do not know the most appropriate array of games to study."
22CR ￿nd these results by comparing responder games to their dictatorial counterparts.
23of 84 percent. Since CR argue that to evaluate the consistency of A-players￿choices it is un-
clear whether one should assume that A estimates the probability of B￿ s subsequent decision
correctly, they report consistency for both cases.23
Table 3: Consistency Results over the 27 Choice Games According to CR
total # of self- social- inequality perfect
observations interest welfare aversion altruism24 IASW
1 232 68% 97% 75% 66% 100%
2 903 79% 91% 76% 67% 97%25
3 671 (with) 69% 97% 90% 53% 98%26
671 (w/o) 94% 99% 100% 65% 100%
4 1574 (with) 73% 94% 82% 61% 98%
1574 (w/o) 84% 95% 86% 66% 98%
Note: (1) B￿ s behavior in the seven dictator games,
(2) B￿ s behavior in all games, (3) A￿ s behavior in the 2-person games
with(out) assumption: A￿ s belief about B is correct, (4) Consistency of all
choices over all games with(out) assumption on A·s belief
While I like CR￿ s novel idea of challenging competing preferences on very simple decision
situations, in my perception their set of decision games lay outside the domain of a model
of pure inequality aversion. Welfare, which can be an independent behavioral motive, was
usually directly concerned, and thus their games constitute an environment in which IASW
preferences should be tested. This appears even more compelling when recognizing that
in the original preference-test a direct relevance of welfare is also considered by CR, who
23In the light of the search for a common parameter-distribution that belongs to a correct model, one
unique distribution should be able to explain several observation across games. Thus going one step further,
assuming that such a distribution is common knowledge, i.e. A estimates the probability of an subsequent
action correctly, is a sensible assumption.
24Consistency of the choices is tested with the model of altruism (4) for the two player case and ￿i = 1
for i 2 f1;2g.
25Consistency violations occur in games 11, 22, 28, 32 by a total number of 4+1+11+9 = 25 B-players.
Allowing for indi⁄erence in games 28, 32 to explain the observed behavior, consistency increases to 99% for
B￿ s behavior and to 100% (99%) for the overall consistency respectively.
26Consistency violations occur in games 1, 13, 31 by a total number of 2 + 3 + 7 = 12 A-players.
24favor a hybrid model. Their social-welfare preferences include the welfare motive (5) as
well as reciprocity. If extending the consistency check, which was chosen as a mean of
evaluation, to the IASW model, then IASW preferences spontaneously outperform the other
types of (social) preferences, including CR￿ s social-welfare preferences. The proportion of
observations compatible with the IASW-model is higher than the proportion compatible
with all other types of preferences. IASW suggest an almost perfect ￿t of the data with
an overall consistency measure of 98 percent.27 As a further benchmark I also analyzed
and report consistency for a model of perfect altruism. In the seven DGs the explanatory
potential of perfect altruism (66 percent) comes close to that of narrow self-interest (68
percent). Otherwise, however, perfect altruism is clearly outperformed.
5.2 Excursion: Flaws in the Consistency Measure
There is an important point to note about the comparison undertaken by CR. The reported
consistency numbers for all types of preferences are based on the idea that a preference pro￿le
is able to ￿t the data with any set of permitted parameter values. Thus the consistency
values do not express the real ￿t of the respective preference models but only a potential
￿t. Consequently, they can only be seen as an upper explanatory success bound. To achieve
the best ￿t of the data, it is necessary to ￿nd one coherent parameter distribution over the
whole player population which is consistent with each single restriction implied by any game
played within the population. A short example illustrates this point and shows that within
the CR data for IASW preferences this is not possible. Consider games 14, 18, and 26 from
the CR data:
27In comparision to pure inequality aversion, IASW buys its consistency gain through the additional
parameter for welfare concern. As can be seen in Table 3 (p. 24), consistency increases between 8-25
percent are directly attributable to ￿i-values >0. IASW with three parameters, nonetheless, is speci￿ed
more parsimoniously than CR￿ s social-welfare preference with ￿ve parameters.
25Table 4: CR - Some Game by Game Results
game pend penter pleft pright
two-person dictator games:
26: B chooses (0;800) vs. (400;400) .78 .22
two-person response games:
14: A chooses (800;0) or lets
B choose (0;800) vs. (400;400) .68 .32 .55 .45
18: A chooses (0;800) or lets
B choose (0;800) vs. (400;400) .00 1.00 .56 .44
Assuming IASW preferences the decision problem "B chooses (0;800) vs. (400;400)"
implies, irrespective of its A-move history, the same restriction on B-player-types in the
(￿;￿)-parameter space: uB(0;800) S uB(400;400) , 1 + 2￿ ￿ ￿ S 0 [henceforth +]. The
(￿;￿)-combinations on the critical threshold-line, where [+] holds as equality, correspond to
the marginal B-players who are indi⁄erent between choosing left or right. Player-types in
the lower half of the (￿;￿)-space [0;1) ￿ [0;1], i.e. underneath the critical line, correspond
to the Bs choosing right. B-types in the upper part choose left. A graphical representation
of these two distinguishable B-type regions is plotted below:
￿gure 7 about here
Since the history of the game does not in￿ uence agents with IASW preferences, the deci-
sion problems 14, 18, and 26 are equivalent from B-players￿perspective, i.e. B-decisions are
independent of the preceding A-decision. Therefore without any hint for a systematic di⁄er-
ence between the player groups invited for these games,28 IASW implies similar proportions
of Bs choosing left and right in all three games. This implication is refuted by the CR data:
Calibrating the IASW model on the choices observed in game 26 requires that 78 percent
of the B-players have (￿;￿)-values above and 22 percent (￿;￿)-values below the critical line
[+]. Games 14 and 18, on the contrary, both suggest that only about 55 percent of the B-
types lie above [+] and 45 percent below [+]. This di⁄erence in the observed proportions of
28CR￿ s experimentees were randomly invited students. Cultural di⁄erences are assumed not to matter.
26the left/right-choices between the two-person dictator game 26 and the two-person response
games 14 and 18 is statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level.29
Thus, clearly these three games are not reconcilable with one single parameter distribu-
tion, even though the IASW model is fully consistent with each of the three single games.30
In other words the extremely high consistency value of the IASW model for the whole data
set cannot be achieved with a unique player-type distribution and the true ￿t for the data lies
below that value. This aspect is the more severe since CR report further history-dependent
inconsistencies in likewise equivalent subgames that point against a unique B-player dis-
tribution. Using a proportion test they ￿nd that on average B-players￿ decisions di⁄er
signi￿cantly between games (7) and (29), (3, 4, 21) and (2, 17), (3, 4, 21) and (10, 2, 17),
(2) and (1), as well as (17) and (13).31 However, they also remark that due to their par-
ticular experimental design, in which players partly make hypothetical decisions, it is likely
that they overestimate the signi￿cance of these di⁄erences, since their observations are not
independent. Nonetheless, when accounting for the possible dependence by reducing the
dataset to the number of independent and actual choices, CR report that an indication for a
systematic in￿ uence of the game history on B￿ s decision making behavior is still supported
by the data, at least for some games. Thus the criticism against the consistency measure is
robust.
Exploring to what extent CR￿ s consistency measure overestimates the true ￿t for each
preference would require calibration of each model. For the IASW model the important
steps of the calibration procedure and some implications of a calibrated model are sketched
below. There was no other attempt to calibrate any other social preference on this data,
especially not by CR for their social-welfare preferences. It thus remains unresolved to what
extent the evaluation of each preference is a⁄ected. Since preferences of pure inequality
aversion are a special case of IASW, inequality aversion faces the problem as described
29CR use a di⁄erence in proportions test (see Charness and Grosskopf 2004) and report p-values of 0.01 for
the null-hypotheses B￿ s allocative decision is equal across games 14 and 26, as well as 18 and 26 respectively.
30CR ￿nd their observations in these three games somewhat puzzling. They do not support any concept
of reciprocity, since the change in B￿ s behavior goes in the same direction, regardless of whether the history
is of kind or unkind behavior. In 14, any A who enters can be understood as a player who commits a
friendly action, which is rewarded by B through a signi￿cantly higher number of equal splits (left-choices).
However, in game 18, where A commits from B￿ s perspective a rather unkind action by entering, subsequent
B behavior changes in the same way. Consequently, it might not be reciprocity, but rather a ￿xed e⁄ect that
is at work. CR report other game pairs, in which similar interpretation of A￿ s move in terms of kindness
induced signi￿cant changes of B￿ s behavior, that can be clearly interpreted as negative reciprocity.
31At the 1%, 15%, 10%, 1% and 1% signi￿cance level, respectively.
27above. Social-welfare preferences, however, are partly motivated by the history speci￿c
systematic di⁄erences of, on the B-player level, equal decisions. Their consistency measure
might therefore not overestimate the true ￿t for the same reasons, but may be ￿ awed in
another, here unexplored way. Eventually, the consistency measure and this speci￿c problem
should not be overvalued in a discussion about preferences, since its adequacy also depends
upon whether a model￿ s parameter restrictions have an intuitive interpretation, whether
implied parameter-value constellations are realistic, and upon how well-known systematic
behavioral patterns are ex ante intentionally covered by a social preference.
This notwithstanding, I believe that three important aspects can be derived from the
consistency results. First, in contradiction of the ￿ndings of CR inequality aversion is a
powerful concept, and has the potential to explain their data (to a much greater extent
than it seemed at a ￿rst glance) once it is extended by welfare concern. Second, with their
own measure of comparison -which is however questionable- the, in this context adequate,
IASW-model is a model of inequality aversion that outperforms the reciprocity and welfare
combination of social-welfare preferences. Third, parts of CR￿ s analysis are based on a
consistency check that can only be understood as an upper con￿dence bound, so that any
conclusion drawn on the consistency measure is problematic.
5.3 Calibration of IASW on the Charness and Rabin (2002) Data
Each choice situation of the CR data implies a linear restriction in the player-type space.
Exemplifying calculations are provided in appendix AIII. (p. 35) All restrictions are planes
in the (￿;￿;￿)-space which separate the type-space in two regions, that collect all player-
types that potentially would have chosen the same way, if asked to enter the particular game.
Because observations of individual participants are from at most seven games, preferences
on the individual level can only be vaguely characterized, by collecting the type-restrictions
for the single players over games. However, the aggregated data is instructive. As all
participants were randomly invited to the experiment I assume that there is no unmod-
elled systematic di⁄erences between players. If this assumption holds, pooling the data
from di⁄erent sessions yields a valid sample in order to analyze the presumably unique
distribution-function, from which all players were drawn.32
32If the full player population (also B-players) were considered, then the assumption that there is no sys-
tematic di⁄erence between players due to their speci￿c role is additionally necessary. The analysis proceeds
with A-players.
28By collecting the game-speci￿c restrictions and corresponding proportion of choices that
were observed in each game, over all players and over all games, I can characterize the
player-type distribution F(￿;￿;￿), for which IASW preferences rationalize the data. For
games that involve both, an advantageous and a disadvantageous inequality status, for an
individual player within one decision, restrictions that characterize F(￿;￿;￿) involve all
three parameters ￿, ￿, and ￿. These restrictions are calculated in appendix AIII. (p. 35,
game 8 et sqq.) Whenever a decision over payo⁄ bundles does not (strongly) change the
players￿inequality status, the restriction implied by the game can -similarly to the UG
procedure-33 be graphed in a reduced two-dimensional (￿;￿)- or (￿;￿)-space. (￿gures 8)
In order to be transparent in the illustration of the model-calibration procedure, I reduce
the amount of available data and exclusively focus on A-players. Of this A-player data, as is
indicated by the consistency measure for A￿ s behavior (table 3, line 3, p. 24), games 1, 13,
and 31 are inconsistent with IASW. They imply A-players with negative (￿;￿)-constellations.
Calibration relies on the remaining 98 percent of IASW consistent A-choices. First ￿gure
8a presents the restrictions implied by and the A-choices observed in the two-person games
3, 4, 5, 7, 21 and 27. These are decision situations in which player A only ￿nds himself in
an equal, or an advantageous inequality, position:
￿gure 8a about here
The arrows in ￿gure 8a pointing to the upper halves of the game-speci￿c threshold lines
indicate the mass of the A-player type-distribution function F(￿;￿;￿), that must fall in
the (￿;￿)-value region associated with the respective arrow. Clearly the (￿;￿)-distribution
looses weight towards high (￿;￿)-values, starting from 47 percent of the players, which could
be purely self-interested. Also, there is evidence for incoherence in the distribution function
implied by these games. While the signi￿cance of the incoherence between A5 (39 percent)
and A27 (41 percent) is low and might be ignored -especially due to the particularity of the
data that includes hypothetical choices- A3 (26 percent) and A4 (17 percent) are consistent
between themselves and stand in contrast to the rest of the data. Indeed, the inconsistency
causes problems in my attempt to identify a unique player-type distribution. Moreover, this
33Recall that in the stylized UG facts no large o⁄ers occur. This implies that proposers are exclusively on
the advantegeous and responders exclusively on the disadvantegeous payo⁄ side.
29signi￿cant systematic shift in the player-type distribution is not a singularity when looking
at the complete dataset. Incoherence of this kind is well interpreted by CR as evidence
for negative reciprocity. Such interpretation is intuitive as reciprocity has the power to use
the information from the sequential game structure. Thus it is likely to be an explanatory
factor whenever the outcome di⁄ers systematically with a changing game history, as partially
observed in the CR-data.
This notwithstanding, most small inconsistencies in the observed proportions are in-
signi￿cant and thus irrelevant. When it comes to the characterization of the player-type
distribution there are in principle three ways to handle the severe inconsistencies. First,
having seen that IASW is a potentially successful approach, which could ￿t the data better
than any other social preferences, one could endogenize its inequality aversion and welfare
concern parameters ￿;￿ and ￿, such that they become bigger, smaller and smaller, respec-
tively after an hostile action; i.e. represent the ￿ avor of negative reciprocity. Secondly, one
could doubt that the di⁄erent players in the various sessions are free from any systematic
di⁄erence and repeat the analysis with subsets.34 Thirdly, one could choose not to pay to
much attention to fully rationalize a particular dataset, but focus on the idea of combining
two motives in order to study their particular interaction.
If one can agree to the latter approach, IASW helps to understand more about the
appropriateness of behavioral motives that compete for explanation of experimental facts.
Regardless which way is ultimately best, there is something very important to learn from
the CR data. While the UG did not lend itself to prove an existence of welfare concerned
players, the CR-data does so. Plotting the restrictions of all the games where A is involved,
in (weakly) advantageous (3, 4, 5, 7, 21, 27) as well as disadvantageous payo⁄-allocations
(11, 18, 22, 28, 32), changes ￿gure 8a as follows:
￿gure 8b about here
Combining the (￿;￿)-restrictions with the implied (￿;￿)-restrictions immediately shows
that -however one thinks about the inconsistency problem- at least 17 percent of all A-
players must have a welfare concern ￿ that is greater than 1
3, and even up to 39 percent
34There are still inconsistencies in player-type distribution when looking, for instance, at the country-
speci￿c data subsets for Spain and the US.
30may do so. This implication in turn is in line with the implication of the stylized UG-facts
that at least 30 percent of the players are not more than moderately welfare concerned, i.e.
￿ ￿ 4
13 (see ￿gure 5b). Surely such characterizations and the consistency check are only the
most basic orientation in model evaluation.
6 Conclusion
A combination of two well-identi￿ed behavioral motives lead me to a model of inequality
aversion and welfare concern. Introducing IASW preferences on the Ultimatum Game al-
lowed concern for welfare to have a latent presence, but its existence could not be identi￿ed.
This result is intuitive since in the UG welfare is unique and ￿xed, if it materializes through
acceptance of an o⁄er. When, in a next step, looking at experimental data, for which the
welfare at stake could directly be in￿ uenced by players￿decisions in a manner that goes
beyond welfare existence, then the experimental evidence of Charness and Rabin (2002), for
instance, implies that 17-39 percent of the players with IASW preferences have a substantial
welfare concern with weight ￿ > 1
3 in their IASW preference, in which self-interest weighs
one. The welfare concern interacts with the concern for inequality aversion and trade-o⁄s
between the two motives were studied extensively. Other welfare concerned player-types
than the 17-39 percent could not be depicted in the calibration but more may worry about
others. In a consistency check, which was carried out on CR￿ s set of simple decision games,
IASW preferences spontaneously beat the neoclassical model, which assumes purely self-
interested behavior of individuals, a model of perfect altruism, Fehr and Schmidt (1999)￿ s
model of inequality aversion and CR￿ s social-welfare preferences. Though remarking that
the ranking according this consistency check is ￿ awed, the ad hoc success of IASW questions
the conclusion of CR (p. 849) that the "apparent adequacy of inequality aversion models
has likely been an artefact of powerful and decisive confounds in the games used to construct
these models."
A very instructive aspect of CR￿ s dataset is that game history systematically matters.
The interpretation of the statistical evidence as (negative) reciprocity is de￿nitely the start-
ing point for understanding why it is not possible to ￿nd one coherent player-type distribu-
tion for the IASW model within their data. Although this is unfortunate for the calibration
of the IASW model on the CR data, it does not worry me too much because I did not intend
to show that inequality aversion combined with welfare concern can completely substitute
31the elaborate idea of reciprocity. Reciprocity could in principle be included in the IASW
model, but how to do so was not considered in this paper. The main intention was to in-
troduce the idea of a behavioral interaction of inequality aversion and welfare concern in
a parsimonious model, which competes with other hybrid-motive social preferences on an
equal level. Aiming for predictive success through an extension may be valuable in further
applications. This consideration notwithstanding, IASW preferences prove that inequality
aversion is an important behavioral factor in an environment, which was recently claimed
by a reciprocity and welfare model, once it is equally extended by welfare concern. Thereby
contrasting with the ￿ndings of CR, the IASW preferences present encouraging evidence for
inequality aversion.
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Appendix AI: Calibration of the IASW Model - Calculating the Optimal O⁄er s￿
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33Appendix AII: CR - Game by Game Results
# two-person dictator games pd pt pl pr
2 B chooses (400;400) vs. (750;375) .52 .48
17 B chooses (400;400) vs. (750;375) .50 .50
29 B chooses (400;400) vs. (750;400) .31 .69
23 B chooses (800;200) vs. (0;0) 1.00 .00
8 B chooses (300;600) vs. (700;500) .67 .33
15 B chooses (200;700) vs. (600;600) .27 .73
26 B chooses (0;800) vs. (400;400) .78 .22
two-person response games - payo⁄s identical
5 A chooses (550;550) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (750;400) .39 .61 .33 .67
7 A chooses (750;0) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (750;400) .47 .53 .06 .94
28 A chooses (100;1000) or lets B choose (75;125) vs. (125;125) .50 .50 .34 .66
32 A chooses (450;900) or lets B choose (200;400) vs. (400;400) .85 .15 .35 .65
two-person response games - B￿ s sacri￿ce helps A
3 A chooses (725;0) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (750;375) .74 .26 .62 .38
4 A chooses (800;0) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (750;375) .83 .17 .62 .38
21 A chooses (750;0) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (750;375) .47 .53 .61 .39
6 A chooses (750;100) or lets B choose (700;500) vs. (300;600) .92 .08 .25 .75
9 A chooses (450;0) or lets B choose (450;350) vs. (350;450) .69 .31 .06 .94
25 A chooses (450;0) or lets B choose (450;350) vs. (350;450) .62 .38 .19 .81
19 A chooses (700;200) or lets B choose (600;600) vs. (200;700) .56 .44 .78 .22
14 A chooses (800;0) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (0;800) .68 .32 .55 .45
1 A chooses (550;550) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (750;375) .96 .04 .93 .07
13 A chooses (550;550) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (750;375) .86 .14 .82 .18
18 A chooses (0;800) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (0;800) .00 1.00 .56 .44
two-person response games - B￿ s sacri￿ce hurts A
11 A chooses (375;1000) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (350;350) .54 .46 .89 .11
22 A chooses (375;1000) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (250;350) .39 .61 .97 .03
27 A chooses (500;500) or lets B choose (800;200) vs. (0;0) .41 .59 .91 .09
31 A chooses (750;750) or lets B choose (800;200) vs. (0;0) .73 .27 .88 .12
30 A chooses (400;1200) or lets B choose (400;200) vs. (0;0) .77 .23 .88 .12
Note: pd, pt, pl and pr abbreviate pend, penter, pleft and pright
34Appendix AIII: Analytical Examples (2, 17, 5) &
Games that Do Not Reveal Information on Parameter Pairs (8, 6)
game pd pt pl pr
games involving only one inequality region
(examples for an analytical solution to the two-player dictator and response games)
2/17: B chooses (400;400) vs. (750;375)35 .51 .49
uB(left) ? uB(right) () uB(400;400) ? uB(750;375)
() 400 + 400￿B ? 375 + 750￿B ￿ 375￿B
() 1 + 15￿B ￿ 14￿B ? 0 =) > <
(holds with "sign" for "proportion")
5: A chooses (550;550) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (750;400) .39 .61 .33 .67
uB(left) ? uB(right) () uB(400;400) ? uB(750;400)
() ￿B ￿ ￿B ? 0 =) > <
uA(end) ? E [uA(enter)] + +
() uB(400;400) ?
￿
pleft ￿ uA(B left) + pright ￿ uA(B right)
￿
A anticipates proportions
() uB(550;550) ? f0:33 ￿ uA(400;400) + 0:67 ￿ uA(750;400)g + +
() 550 + 550￿A ? f0:33 ￿ [400 + 400￿A] + 0:67 ￿ [750 + 400￿A ￿ 350￿A]g
() 1 ￿ 469
169￿A ￿ 300
169￿A 7 0 =) < > (= (=
games involving both inequality regions (analytical analysis for all relevant games)
8: B chooses (300;600) vs. (700;500) .67 .33
uB(left) ? uB(right)
() 300 + 600￿B ￿ 300￿B ? 700 + 500￿B ￿ 200￿B
() 1 + 3
4￿B ￿ 1
2￿B ￿ 1
4￿B ? 0 =) > <
6: A chooses (750;100) or lets B choose (750;500) vs. (300;600) .92 .08 .25 .75
uA(end) ? E [uA(enter)]
() uB(750;100) ?
￿
pleft ￿ uA(B left) + pright ￿ uA(B right)
￿
() 750 + 100￿A ￿ 650￿A ? f0:25 ￿ [750 + 500￿A ￿ 250￿A] + 0:75 ￿ [300 + 600￿A ￿ 300￿A]g
() 1 + 1
2aA ￿ 13
7 ￿A ￿ 1
4￿A ? 0 =) > <
Note: pd, pt, pl and pr abbreviate pend, penter, pleft and pright
35Indi⁄erence uB(left) = uB(right) disregarded.
35Appendix AIII (continued):
Games that Do Not Reveal Information on Parameter Pairs (9, 25, 19, 14, 30)
game pd pt pl pr
9: A chooses (450;0) or lets B choose (450;350) vs. (350;450) .69 .31 .06 .94
uA(end) ? E [uA(enter)] () uB(450;0) ?
￿
pleft ￿ uA(B left) + pright ￿ uA(B right)
￿
() 450 ￿ 450￿A ? f0:06 ￿ [450 + 350￿A ￿ 100￿A] + 0:94 ￿ [350 + 450￿A ￿ 100￿A]g
() 1 + 94
95aA ￿ 423
95 ￿A ￿ 444
95 ￿A ? 0 =) > <
25: A chooses (450;0) or lets B choose (450;350) vs. (350;450) .62 .38 .19 .81
uA(end) ? E [uA(enter)] () uB(450;0) ?
￿
pleft ￿ uA(B left) + pright ￿ uA(B right)
￿
() 450 ￿ 450￿A ? f0:19 ￿ [450 + 350￿A ￿ 100￿A] + 0:81 ￿ [350 + 450￿A ￿ 100￿A]g
() 1 + ￿A ￿ 431
81 ￿A ￿ 431
81 ￿A ? 0 =) > <
19: A chooses (700;200) or lets B choose (600;600) vs. (200;700) .56 .44 .78 .22
uA(end) ? E [uA(enter)]
() uB(700;200) ?
￿
pleft ￿ uA(B left) + pright ￿ uA(B right)
￿
() 700 + 200￿A ￿ 500￿A ? f0:78 ￿ [600 + 600￿A] + 0:22 ￿ [200 + 700￿A ￿ 500aA]g
() 1 + 55
94￿A ￿ 125
47 ￿A ￿ 211
94 ￿A ? 0 =) > <
14: A chooses (800;0) or lets B choose (400;400) vs. (0;800) .68 .32 .55 .45
uA(end) ? E [uA(enter)]
() uB(800;0) ?
￿
pleft ￿ uA(B left) + pright ￿ uA(B right)
￿
() 800 ￿ 800￿A ? f0:55 ￿ [400 + 400￿A] + 0:45 ￿ [800￿A ￿ 800￿A]g
() 1 + 18
29aA ￿ 40
29￿A ￿ ￿A ? 0 =) > >
30: A chooses (400;1200) or lets B choose (400;200) vs. (0;0) .77 .23 .88 .12
uA(end) ? E [uA(enter)]
() uB(400;1200) ?
￿
pleft ￿ uA(B left) + pright ￿ uA(B right)
￿
() 400 + 1200￿A ￿ 800￿A ? 0:88 ￿ [400 + 200￿A ￿ 200￿A] + 0:12 ￿ 0
() 1 ￿ 50
3 ￿A + 11
3 ￿A ￿ 64
3 ￿A ? 0 =) > <
Note: pd, pt, pl and pr abbreviate pend, penter, pleft and pright
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38Figure 1: Generalized Dictator Game
( 1-t , m·t ) D
m·t
( dictator , receiver )
( 1-t , m·t ) D
m·t
( dictator , receiver )
t: transfer, m: multiplier, 1-t+mt: ﬁnal surplus, m=1 standard DG, m =1






















































Proposer-types (β,γ) left of line 1 choose s∗
L. Types right of line 1 prefer sM.
As p(s∗
L) → 1 line 1 converges to line 2, i.e. s∗
L is considered by more
proposers.Figure 5a: Distribution of Acceptance Thresholds
and Corresponding Responder-Types Implied by UG Data























Responder-types, which make stylized oﬀers, are determined by (α,γ)-values
on the respective lines.Figure 5b: Proposer-Type Distribution Implied by UG Data















 γ  = 4/13 
1-17/4⋅β P-13/4⋅γ P=0
1-2⋅β P-γ P=0
T h e3 0 %o ft h ep r o p o s e r - t y p e s ,w h i c hm a k eo ﬀer s∗ =1 /3 in equilibrium, have
(β,γ)-values left of the solid line. Another 30%, which oﬀer s∗ =4 /9,h a v e
(β,γ)-values between the lines. The 40%, which oﬀer s =0 .5,h a v e
(β,γ)-values right of the dashed line.Figure 6: Two-Person Dictator Game (left) vs.






































end)Figure 7: G a m e2 6—Bc h o o s e s(0,800) vs. (400,400)
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0.0 1.0 0.5Figure 8b: Combining A-Players’ (β,γ) and (α,γ) Distribution
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